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Abstract: Body image and body schema are 
two phenomenological concepts which generat-
ed a revival of Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s philo-
sophical heritage. In the present text I intend 
to inquire on the relation between these two 
concepts and that of Logos of life, another chal-
lenging point in the Merleau-Pontyan thought.  
In order to delineate the correlation be-
tween body schema, body image and my un-
derstanding of a logic of life, I will first explore 
how what I term “schematism of the body” is 
connected to an inherent model of life and 
living and how this schematism is reflected in 
the body image. I will turn further to the rela-
tion between body and world and highlight how 
the life of the body defines itself as meaningful 
in the context of both the surrounding world 
(Umwelt) and the life-world (Lebenswelt). In a 
third part of my analysis I shall point out how 
the relation between body schematism and 
motile intentionality redefines corporeal inten-
tionality. I shall conclude by noting the role of 
the Logos of life, through which corporeity, in 
its position of meaning project, is instituted as 




Key Words: Body Schema, Body Image, Logos 
of the World, Logos of Life, Intentionality. 
 
 
Resumen: Los conceptos fenomenológicos de 
imagen corporal y esquema corporal han dado 
lugar a un resurgimiento del legado filosófico de 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty. En este texto pretendo 
investigar la relación entre estos dos conceptos 
y el de Logos de la vida, otro elemento estimu-
lante del pensamiento Merleau-Pontiano. 
Con el fin de trazar la correlación entre es-
quema corporal, imagen corporal y mi interpre-
tación de la lógica de la vida, exploraré en pri-
mer lugar cómo el término “esquematismo del 
cuerpo” está conectado con un modelo inheren-
te de vida y de vivir, y cómo este esquematis-
mo se refleja en la imagen corporal. Conside-
raré después la relación entre cuerpo y mundo 
y remarcaré cómo la vida del cuerpo se define 
como significativa en el contexto tanto del 
mundo circundante (Umwelt) como del mundo 
de la vida (Lebenswelt). En la tercera parte de 
mi análisis señalaré cómo la relación entre 
esquematismo corporal e intencionalidad moto-
ra redefine la intencionalidad corporal. Con-
cluiré destacando el papel del Logos de la vida, 
a través del cual la corporeidad, en su posición 




Palabras clave: Esquema corporal, imagen 






56 DENISA BUTNARU 
 




Current discussions on the concepts of body schema and body image (Gal-
lagher, 2005; Gallagher & Zahavi, 2008; Sheets-Johnstone 2009a) raise once 
again the legacy of Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological heritage. These 
concepts are at the core of a paradigmatic shift within the Merleau-Pontyan tra-
dition in phenomenology. Reorienting the phenomenological analysis of con-
sciousness to an analysis of embodiment, Merleau-Ponty consecrates a per-
spective in which the body as a phenomenological project does not represent a 
moment of constitution anymore but rather a moment of “institution” (Séglard, 
1995: 14). Such a reversal challenges the status of the subject and the re-
sources through which at a more global level subjectivity is defined. 
I intend to highlight the relation between the concepts of body schema and 
life, and show their necessity in the definition of a new form of Logos. The Mer-
leau-Pontyan opus offers a non-systematic understanding of life and of its rela-
tion to Logos, his development of this topic being realized mostly in his lec-
tures. This constant interest in the resources which ground meaning involved 
his taking into account this concept. For Merleau-Ponty, Logos is correlated to 
body, to the world and also to language (Merleau-Ponty: 1945). Yet this con-
cept characterizes as well nature and life. Given these many aspects, the dis-
cussion of the body schematism, of its correlation to the body image as well as 
their roles in formulating a Logos of life becomes an important issue for the 
phenomenology of embodiment.  
The impact of life in its actualization as Logos, is even more obvious if we 
consider the ontological status of the body. A body which exists is first and 
foremost a living body1 (Leib) and a corps vivant, a living body; that is why a 
discussion of meaning cannot avoid life. What is also important to be noted in a 
phenomenological analysis is that life does not characterize only the living 
body, but also consciousness. Therefore discussing life becomes a condition 
sine qua non in any context in which meaning is involved. Merleau-Ponty devel-
ops gradually a phenomenology of embodiment and the paradigmatic turn he 
 
 
1 The translation of the Husserlian terms Leib in English and French was that of “own body” and “corps 
propre”. However, I think that Leib shows primordially a deep connection to life and living before being a 
matter of “ownership”, even if in Husserl’s analysis the issue at stake remains the individuation of the 
subjective sphere in its quality of own sphere.   
BODY SCHEMA(TISM) AND THE LOGOS OF LIFE: A PHENOMENOLOGICAL RECONSIDERATION 57 
 
Investigaciones Fenomenológicas, vol. Monográfico 4/I (2013): Razón y Vida. 57 
 
institutes has essential consequences for the significance that consciousness 
holds, at least in the Husserlian perspective. His definition of consciousness in 
terms of “consciousness of life” (conscience de la vie) (Merleau-Ponty 1942: 
199), represents a first moment in which the question of meaning is revised. It 
also draws attention to how the schematism of living emerges as meaningful 
living. Even though the topic of life is of obvious interest in the context of an 
analysis of consciousness, in what follows I intend to highlight how life is im-
posed as a phenomenological principle at the level of the body, under a form 
which I shall denote “body schematism”. 
The notions of body schema and body image account for the properties of 
modelling and remodelling through which embodied life manifests itself as life. 
An inquiry into the body schematism and the body image highlights a form of 
regularity which attests to the body as a living schematism, and such a prop-
erty may be recognizable as a form of Logos. These two concepts are also sig-
nificant because they exemplify a duplicity which is omnipresent in the Merleau-
Pontyan writings, for instance, the duplicity of visibility and invisibility, imma-
nence and transcendence, subject and the world.  
In order to delineate the correlation between body schema, body image and 
my understanding of a logic of life, I will first explore how the schematism of 
the body is correlated to an inherent model of life and living and how this 
schematism is reflected in the body image. I shall do so by examining these 
concepts in the work of Merleau-Ponty and that of Shaun Gallagher and Dan 
Zahavi. Second, I will turn to the relation between body and world and stress 
how the life of the body defines itself as meaningful in the context of both the 
surrounding world (Umwelt) and the life-world (Lebenswelt). In a third part of 
my analysis I shall point out how the new body schematism that appears in 
motile intentionality allows a new understanding of the corporeal intentionality. 
I shall conclude by underlining the indispensability of acknowledging a Logos of 
life, through which corporeity, in its position of meaning project, is instituted as 
body schematism.  
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1. A FIRST PHENOMENOLOGICAL UNDERSTANDING OF THE BODY SCHEMA 
 
The concept of “body schema” has given rise to many terminological de-
bates2. In the phenomenological field, a first discussion was carried out by Mau-
rice Merleau-Ponty. Merleau-Ponty’s analysis of this concept had in particular a 
methodological purpose. His intention, like that of Husserl, was, first, to detach 
himself from naturalizing psychological tendencies. Second, he tried to develop 
a phenomenology which overcame the dichotomy between body and conscious-
ness. In order to achieve such a goal, he proposed a return to embodiment and 
to the relation of the body to the world. In such a context, the definition of the 
body schema for phenomenological purposes is particularly important.  
In a first attempt in which Merleau-Ponty tries to define the body schema, 
he qualifies it as “a resumé of our bodily experience, which is capable of making 
a comment and giving a signification to the interoceptivity and the propriocep-
tivity of the moment” (Merleau-Ponty, 1945: 114). The body schema is con-
nected to motility, to our ability to inscribe ourself in the world as spatializing 
instances, as instances that mark and create spatiality. We integrate space as 
traced space, as a meaningful environment. Further, the body schema is char-
acterized as a principle that gives coherence to the body, as “a body drawing” 
which is supported by a “unique law” (Merleau-Ponty, 1945: 115) and further 
as “a global awareness of [my] posture in the intersensitive world, a form in 
the sense of the Gestaltpsychologie” (Merleau-Ponty, 1945: 116). The body 
schema in this Merleau-Pontyan understanding has the function of replacing 
consciousness with the body and of establishing the body as the primary princi-
ple in our encounter with the world.  
Although it is sometimes mis-understood in a static and pointillist perspec-
tive3, the body schematism is in constant transformation. The body schema has 
a dual function, and this recalls the Husserlian paradox of subjectivity. In 
Husserl’s view, one is not only a subject in the world but also an object in the 
world (Husserl, 1954: 182). In the same spirit, following Merleau-Ponty’s 
 
 
2 Shaun Gallagher’s extensive study How the Body Shapes the Mind is an important resource for the 
conceptual differences that marked the history of this concept.  
3 Maxine Sheets-Johnstone is one of the defenders of an anti-pointillist conception of the body, propos-
ing an understanding of our bodily existence in terms of a kinetic melody (Sheets-Johnstone, 2006; 
Sheets-Johnstone 2009a; Sheets-Johnstone, 2009b).  
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analysis, it is obvious that the body schema does not ensure only an individua-
tion of subjectivity as such but also a connection to the world, an opposition to 
other forms of living, which could be understood as “objectification”. This fun-
damental connection among different forms of existence is described by Mer-
leau-Ponty in terms of “flesh” (Merleau-Ponty, 1964). In some of his later writ-
ings, the same bond is delineated in terms of “nature” (Merleau-Ponty, 1995). I 
consider that the double quality of the body schematism as being both a border 
for forms of existence and a connection among beings, is reflected in the idea 
of regularity of life, namely in Logos.   
The body schema is also the element that recalls the constitution of the 
own body (Leib/ corps propre). In the Husserlian perspective the constitution of 
the own body is conceived in relation to sensations, and more specifically to 
kinaesthetic sensations (Husserl, 1952: §36). Merleau-Ponty rediscusses this 
form of sensations, which he names “double sensations”, and he introduces an 
essential element in his description of the own body: movement and “motor 
intentionality” (Merleau-Ponty, 1945: 128, 160-161, 183-184, 444). Motility 
recalls the presence of animation, and therefore of life. Movement is not only 
characteristic of the human subject but is also the characteristic of any form of 
life, starting with the division of cells up to other complex forms of living organ-
isms. Motility reverses the problem of intentionality insofar as the position of 
subjective consciousness is considered. Its role is to show that the phenome-
nology of embodiment and the body schematism are essentially a phenomenol-
ogy of life grounded in a principle of animation4. 
The body schema, more than being merely connected to movement has a 
dynamic quality in the Merleau-Pontyan view and it institutes the body both as 
living body (corps vivant) and own body (corps propre). In addition, the body 
schema is a first moment that covers on the one hand any realization of mean-
ing and on the other the connection between any form meaning that the body 
as embodied presence assimilates, and other forms revealed by other living 
bodies. Connected to an awareness of our situatedness as being-in-the-world, 
the body schema is a first relation to space. More fundamentally even: it repre-
sents one of the principles according to which life gains depth and manifests 
 
 
4 For an analysis of animation and of its phenomenological implications see Maxine Sheets-Johnstone’s 
(2009a). 
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itself in interconnection with a worldly principle. The Merleau-Pontyan approach 
stresses in particular this intertwining (Verflechtung) between the body schema 
and the world and reorients the phenomenological inquiry towards a connective 
and integrative approach. The body is not only a guarantee of my being a sub-
ject; it is the guarantee of my belonging to a world and to other bodies. Given 
its articulation as body schema, the body is from the beginning intercorporeal, 
and it makes us from the beginning “intersubjectively open” (Zahavi in Thomp-
son, 2001: 15).     
The discussion of the body schema allows a new understanding of the logic 
of life because it is connected to motility and it entails a regularity through 
which the schematism of the body emerges within a larger movement which is 
that of life. This regularity refers to the organism as living according to certain 
laws and principles which are constantly changing, an idea that recalls once 
more the principle of animation5. The existence of such laws should not be 
however understood in naturalistic terms. They represent a configuration be-
tween the body and the world, as well as between the body and other bodies. 
In such a context, the body schema becomes the very field through which such 
laws emerge. An inquiry on its potential highlights it as a condition for any in-
tentional manifestation and for the minimal coherence of our being in the world. 
The body schema is that background without which we cannot define ourselves 
as subjects; it is the pre-awareness the renders the body to the world and the 
world to the body (Merleau-Ponty, 1945: 117).  
 
 
2. BODY SCHEMA REVISED 
 
In a more recent definition developed by Shaung Gallagher (Gallagher 
2005; Gallagher & Zahavi, 2008) the understanding of the body schema is re-
stated. Gallagher criticizes the fact that the body schema was frequently asso-
ciated with or subsumed under that of body image, and he shows that this was 
prone to much confusion (Gallagher, 2005: 17-39). He makes a clear distinc-
tion between these two terms, which is capital to understand the levels that 
characterize the Logos of life. In his view, the body schema is characterized as 
 
 
5 For a detailed analysis of the principle of animation and its relation to the phenomenology of the body, 
see Maxine Sheets-Johnstone (Ibid.) 
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“1) the close-to-automatic system of processes that constantly regulates pos-
ture and movement to serve intentional action and 2) our pre-reflective and 
non-objectifying body-awareness” (Gallagher & Zahavi, 2008: 146). Such an 
understanding supports a first hypothesis that the primary schematism, dis-
played by the body, enacts a basic correlation, an idea also affirmed by the 
Merleau-Pontyan approach. This refers to “the connection of an idea and an 
existence which are indiscernible, [to] the contingent arrangement by which 
materials begin to have meaning in our presence, intelligibility in the nascent 
state” (Merleau-Ponty, 1942: 223).  
The concept of the body image consists according to Gallagher in “a com-
plex set of intentional states and dispositions – perceptions, beliefs, and atti-
tudes – in which the intentional object is one own’s body. This involves a form 
of reflexive or self-referential intentionality” (Gallagher, 2005: 25). An essential 
difference between the body schema and the body image is the intentional fac-
tor. In Gallagher’s opinion, the body schema eludes intentionality. It is “a sys-
tem of sensory-motor capacities that function without awareness or the neces-
sity of monitoring” (Gallagher, 2005: 24), while the body image maintains this 
characteristic. “Although a body schema is not in itself a form of consciousness, 
or in any way a cognitive operation, it can enter into and support (or in some 
cases undermine) intentional activity, including cognition” (Gallagher, 2005: 
26). The body schema is a body background; it represents that potentiality 
which contributes to the acknowledgement of the body as living body.  
What is crucial to retain from Gallagher’s definitions of this concept is that 
the body schema precedes intentionality and connects the human body to a 
more general corporeality which is that of nature as world. It guarantees the 
primary moment of phenomenality, insofar as this phenomenality is understood 
as corporeal life. For, as Renaud Barabars argues,  
 
if corporeal life transcends itself in an existential significance that goes beyond 
natural needs, it is also true that this significance, whatever it may be, is rooted in 
corporeal life. In other words, it is life itself that transcends its natural or biological 
dimension and involves the whole realm of meaning: [...] we must be alive and 
have sense organs to experience anything and, finally, to perceive a world (2005: 
210-211).  
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An inquiry into the body schema helps to understand the projection of life 
as meaningful project. Moreover, the correlation between body schema and 
body image reproduces the problematic of embodiment as a logic of life, in the 
sense that while the body schema is the way in which our existence is manifest, 
the body image partly translates the body schema through intentional manifes-
tations. For the purpose of my demonstration, I intend only to focus on the ba-
sic description of the body image.   
The distinction between body schema and body image is central for the dis-
cussion of a logic of life because it is correlated with a form of doubleness that 
characterizes the conceptual background in the Merleau-Pontyan work. The 
regularity through which the body becomes manifest has to be understood as 
an intertwining between these two levels of schematism and image. The body 
schematism is often diffuse. It is a “tacit contribution” (Gallagher, 2005: 26; 
Gallagher and Zahavi, 2008: 146), while the body image presents the mani-
fested body; it only shows that which is “originated, i.e. the personal self” (Mer-
leau-Ponty, 1945: 451). A body image is a moment through which the body 
becomes present, whereas the schematic aspect represents the corporeal mo-
ment through which “the body effaces itself in its projects” (Gallagher, 2005: 
38; Leder, 1990). This feature of diffuseness recalls both the lively tissue within 
which the body appears as body schema and the participation of the body 
within nature. Thus the body schematism shows a double regularity that tran-
spires at two different levels of Logos: a Logos of life and a Logos of nature. For 
Merleau-Ponty, these two regularities are equivalent. As he puts it “there is na-
ture wherever there is a life that has a meaning, but where, however, there is 
not thought. [...] Nature is what it has a meaning, without this meaning being 
posited by thought: it is the autoproduction of meaning” (Merleau-Ponty, 
[1956-1957] 1995: 19).  
The meaning displayed as nature appears in corporeality as meaning dis-
played in the living being; the analysis of the body schematism allows the join-
ing of these two aspects of nature and living, into one. Meaning is traceable as 
living and through projects of living in the “body schematism”. As Renaud 
Barabaras argues “this meaning of being emerges from a study of living beings, 
to such an extent that nature originally means life, or in other words that there 
is an original sense of nature that accounts for the possibility of life” (2005: 
223). These moments of transition that make the understanding of living in-
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separable from the understanding of nature and therefore of the structure of 
meaning in general, are encompassed in the correlation between body schema 
and body image. The idea that the “body schema is always something in excess 
of that of which I can be conscious” (Gallagher, 2005: 38) and that is defined 
as a regularity, entails a first inscription of the body in the world and its dynam-
ics as living body. Through its diffuseness, the body schematism asserts the 
opacity of nature and life.   
A phenomenology that chooses the theme of corporeal schematism is nec-
essarily a phenomenology of life and gains ontological implications. The interest 
in the body schema as the primordial moment of the regularity of conscious-
ness and of intentionality, resituates both the Merleau-Pontyan understanding 
of this concept as well as its recent development. The body schema becomes 
that bridge that joins human existence to other forms of existence and contrib-
utes to the reorientation of phenomenological analysis towards a specific form 
of passivity: that of life and nature.  
Nature and bodily being are sustained in their development by a diffuse 
form of meaning. As Merleau-Ponty argues, the body schematism becomes the 
reflection “of a being of the order of Logos and not of the ‘pure thing’” (1995: 
209). Through this primary moment of corporeity, the body schema ensures 
our resonance in the world and through the world. It affirms life as a constant 
transitivity, as an infinite correspondence through which the subjected body 
overcomes itself in order to assert a new form of schematism, that which Mer-
leau-Ponty names Ineneinander. The body schematism is simultaneously a 
connection to nature, and a connection to life, a connection between a form of 
life and other forms of life. Therefore the reality of the body schematism 
emerges in the tension between Leib and Körper, in the overlapping that these 
corporeal dimensions operate on each other.  
 
 
3. THE LIVING BODY 
 
Following the previously mentioned ideas, the phenomenological distinction 
established by Husserl between Leib and Körper (Husserl, 1950; Husserl, 1952) 
could correspond with the Merleau-Pontyan couplets of body schematism and 
life. For Husserl, Leib serves a particular purpose, namely to individuate the 
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egological sphere and to show the importance of corporeity in the more com-
plex problematic of intentionality. Leib is therefore a privileged level, that in-
cludes Körper, but which promotes a principle of individuation – “an own body”. 
The idea of “ownness” prevails over that of living, the bodily quality serving a 
specific reduction that clarifies the status of the subjective sphere. Further-
more, what is essential for the Husserlian definition of the “own body” (Leib) 
are kinaesthetic sensations. For Husserl, a first individuation of corporeity as 
subjectivity is identified at this level (Husserl, 1952: §36-37). The idea of kin-
aesthetic sensations refers to the fact that when I experience an object, for in-
stance when I touch a table, the object in question is doubly seized. On the one 
hand, I tactually feel the object in its exteriority; on the other the object im-
prints itself on me. I feel the sensations that result from the pressure I exert on 
the table. These kinaesthetic sensations are different from those sensations, 
which are defined by Husserl in terms of an “effect” (1952: §36) and which 
constitute the features of the things as such (1952: §18). This second type of 
sensation is called aesthetic by Husserl.  
Kinaesthetic sensations are important in a discussion of the body schema-
tism because they refer to a form of engagement of the body. They refer to the 
way in which the body is attuned to the world it experiences. They announce 
the quality of the body as Leib and it is this Leiblichkeit that allows a meaning-
ful transition in the world. Being preoccupied by the status of intentional con-
sciousness, Husserl often subsumed corporeity to a principle of transparency. 
This is also quite explicit in his analyses of intersubjectivity, in particular in his 
Cartesian Meditations, where Leib comes once more into question. Thus corpo-
reity represents the field upon which Otherness is constituted through the proc-
ess of appresentation and coupling (Paarung). Yet, here too, the body remains 
always an “own body”, an “eigenheitlich reduziertes Leib” (Husserl, 1950: §44).  
It is only in the Merleau-Pontyan analysis that the reality of ownness is ex-
tended and leads in the end to the conceptualization of the body as foundation 
of all existence and finally to its understanding as “flesh” (Merleau-Ponty, 
1964). Leib receives the meaning of “living body” even though still conceived as 
“corps propre”. Merleau-Ponty develops indirectly the idea of a “corps vivant”, 
since the essence of “Leib” is inseparable from “Leben”, just as the essence of 
the flesh is also life. In his analysis, there is a first resource in which the corre-
lation between the body schematism and a Logos of life can be claimed. The 
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body is a milieu between the subjective sphere and the world. And yet before 
having this transition function, the body is an expression of life. It is as life that 
the body dissolves in the world and defines itself as opaque moment.  
Merleau-Ponty reorients the phenomenological inquiry from a body which is 
a centre in itself, from a body which is a centre of perception and sensations 
and thus a guarantee of spatiality and intersubjectivity (Husserl, 1952: §41-42; 
1950: §53-54) to a body which is connected to other bodies as forms of life. He 
goes thus beyond the idea of “own body-ness” and restates it in terms of a “liv-
ing-ness”. For, as Christopher Macann argues,  
 
being a body means not merely being that very body which one is oneself, but also 
standing in relation to other bodies which also have the meaning of being bodies for 
themselves and, moreover, coming thereby to see oneself from the standpoint of 
the other as an embodied being for the other (1991: 102),  
 
an other which may be extended to any other form of being.  
An understanding of the body as living re-conceives the status of intention-
ality along with the status of corporeity in general. The Husserlian perspective 
in which consciousness is defined as a consciousness-of is replaced in a body 
focused approach by the body-of (corps à) (De Saint Aubert, 2005: 135). This 
change implies that any form of directedness is projected under another form of 
schematism than the schematism legitimated by consciousness. Embodiment 
has its own laws; similar to consciousness, it has a capacity of schematizing, 
including a “logological” characteristic. The analysis of the body schematism 
shows how the body portrays a double characteristic: a first moment in which 
the body legitimates itself as an instance of Verleiblichung, and a second mo-
ment in which the body remains a “verkörpert” project, in which it is connected 
to the brute fact of life and of nature. This double configuration could be asso-
ciated with the distinction between the body schema and the body image, dis-
cussed by Gallagher. Yet, as already mentioned, the body schema has no inten-
tional aspect in this approach.   
I consider therefore that the re-evaluation of the Merleau-Pontyan project 
on body schematism and the return to the fungierende Intentionalität, which is 
a corporeal intentionality, restores corporeal schematism to its phenomenologi-
cal importance. The Körper is constantly “verleiblicht”; it is overcome by an 
inner movement which sustains its quality of being lively (lebendig) and imbri-
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cated in a net of life. In this sense, the body schematism affirms itself as a logic 
of living, as a logic of life and in such a movement through which life is as-
serted, it releases the body in the world. For if embodiment as “Verleiblichung” 
asserts life, it also creates a profound connection with the world and it underlies 
the ego’s understanding of life-world. As an animated body, and thus as living 
body, the Leib overcomes the Körper and presents itself not as an object in the 
world, but “as means of communication with it” (Merleau-Ponty, 1945: 109). 
The interrogation of Leib becomes correlated to an inquiry on the status of the 
life-world, which is the matrix of meanings, and also of any form of intentional-
ity. As a result, the double reality of the Leib-Körper and its import for the body 
schematism requires a consideration of the duality Lebenswelt-Umwelt, which I 
shall explore in what follows. 
 
 
4. THE WORLDLY LOGOS AND THE LOGOS OF LIFE 
  
An inquiry on a Logos of life and on its connection to the body schematism, 
the conceptual couple body schema-body image is useful because it underlines 
the doublure which the body presents in its relation to the world. According to 
Emmanuel Alloa, Merleau-Ponty’s conception of logos remains equivocal (2008: 
105). The types of Logos vary according to the questions that lie beneath Mer-
leau-Ponty’s terminological development. He postulates for instance a Logos of 
the perceptual world (1945: 490), a Logos correlated to the tacit cogito and in 
Le visible et l’invisible he mentions a particular conception of Logos, which he 
understands as a double Logos divided between a logos endiathetos (a latent 
logos) and a logos prophorikos (a logos which exteriorizes itself).  
The couple logos endiathetos and logos prophorikos is also mentioned in 
Merleau-Ponty’s lectures on nature ([1959-1960] 1995). The first is defined as 
“a logos of the natural world, an aesthetic logos” ([1959-1960] 1995: 274). It 
is diffuse and indispensable for any form of existence, and similarly to the body 
schema it remains most often tacit. Furthermore, being connected to an aes-
thetic dimension, it expresses itself as negativity. The second type of logos, the 
logos prophorikos which characterizes basically perception is complementary to 
the logos endiathetos and recalls a reversibility that qualifies any form of living 
and especially that primordial layer of living, which is the Umwelt. The logos 
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endiathetos and logos prophorikos play a particular role in the realization of the 
logos of life. They are on the one hand connected to life as a principle per se, 
and on the other they are indispensably related to the configurations of mun-
daneity. That we are first and foremost living and animated beings is an idea 
that occurs both in Merleau-Ponty’s as well as in Husserl’s writings. However, 
what the Merleau-Pontyan perspective brings forth is that the Logos is corre-
lated to living-ness (nature); it is in this sense that the Logos appears not only 
as a principle of perception, sensation or corporeality, but as an indispensable 
element that organizes life. The relation between Logos and life emerges more 
strongly in the Merleau-Pontyan texts when he discusses the structure of the 
Umwelt and of the Lebenswelt (life-world). Both these layers of mundaneity 
maintain a specific relation to living and offer an occasion to consider the body 
as schematism and its interconnectedness to Logos. However, there are clear 
distinctions between these two life-mundane projects. In what follows, I shall 
point out some of their differences as well as their influence on the body sche-
matism. 
A return to Umwelt implies a return to non-distinctive moments of life. The 
Umwelt escapes thematization, although it remains intrinsic to any process in 
which corporeity institutes meaning. As Ted Toadvine puts it, “[...] the Umwelt 
itself cannot be reduced to subject or object; it is, instead, a kind of self-
organization at the level of life” (2009: 88). Belonging to the Umwelt, and 
therefore to life in its primitive and brute aspect, the body confirms in addition 
another quality: that of being opaque. The Umwelt is a first moment that guar-
antees this opacity. In the Merleau-Pontyan phenomenological conception opac-
ity is opposed to the transparency of consciousness. A first reversal that he 
postulates for the overcoming of transparency and for the return to opacity is 
embodiment as such. I believe that a phenomenology of living can deepen even 
more an inquiry on the status of opacity. A return to life, in its form of Logos, 
can challenge the regularity confirmed by consciousness and highlight a new 
principle that sustains any phenomenal possibility. In this sense, opacity is not 
negativity; on the contrary, it has a positive quality, in that it confirms an infin-
ity of possible surroundings in which human life in its relatedness to other re-
gimes of life is accomplished. One of the levels in which the opacity of lives 
emerges is that of the Umwelt.  
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The Umwelt also strongly related to the logos endiathetos, underlining that 
brute nature is already meaningful (Toadvine, 2009: 89). Life is guided by 
meaning even in its most basic forms for Merleau-Ponty. This characteristic be-
comes clear in the examination of the relation between life as Logos and Um-
welt. Given its status of fusing multiple levels of meaning, the Umwlet is that 
constant resource through which any corporeal project appears as organized 
through a logic of life. It is only when the living body defines its actions within 
the Umwelt, that the Umwelt is transformed into a Welt ([1959-1960] 1995: 
284; 1945: 144). The quality of a living body in its most schematic aspect is 
inseparable from the Umwelt; on the other hand when the living body sur-
passes the level of the Umwelt, it realizes what I would call a significative leap. 
Through this leap corporeity gains an institutive quality. Life in its connection to 
mundaneity, undergoes as well a transposal – it does not appear as logos en-
diathetos anymore, but as logos prophorikos.  
The body manifests a similar form of logic according to Merleau-Ponty. 
Such an imbrication and duality confirm that the living-ness of the body cannot 
be separated in a first perspective from the Umwelt.  
 
The Umwelt is therefore not outside the body, and the body is not other than the 
Umwelt [...] the two terms must be understood as divergences to one another; 
[...]. The coupling with an Umwelt is, then, precisely what clarifies the profound 
correlation of the body and the world (Hansen, 2005: 252)  
 
as well as the Ineinender operated by life.  
 Umwelt is also understood by Merleau-Ponty as Offenheit (VI: 266, 305) 
and as inseparable from the Lebenswelt. This is a second layer of mundaneity 
from which the body as body schematism cannot be separated.  The correlation 
Lebenswelt-Umwelt transpires also in the relation between body schema and 
body image. For, if the Umwelt is the moment where significations remain dif-
fuse, the Lebenswelt is that world of life, where significations are actualized, 
even if they remain unthematized. And through their silence they also adhere 
to the logos endiathetos (Merleau-Ponty, 1964: 222; 224). The Lebenswelt is a 
realm of the body schematism that, in contrast to the Umwelt, receives an ad-
ditional form of signification. The auxiliary meaning strata are actualized in 
what Merleau-Ponty defines as the “junction of Physis and Logos [...] [or in the 
junction of] Physis-Logos-History” (Merleau-Ponty, [1959-1960] 1995: 259). 
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This ternary combination of Physis, Logos and History leads the analysis on the 
status of the body schematism to a “regressive interrogation” (Husserl, 1956: 
280), requalifying the principles of the genetic phenomenology and reinstating 
the principle of opacity. However, in the context of the correlation between Le-
benswelt and Umwelt, opacity does not refer only to an exclusion of the “clar-
ity” of rational/transcendental consciousness, or to a return to the originarity of 
mundaneity. It refers implicitly to a more basic conversion, which is that of life, 
of life as a grounding regularity for any form that mundanely exists. In such a 
context “to uncover a living dimension at the transcendental level, that is, a 
sense of life more basic than the difference between the transcendental and 
natural consciousness” (Barbaras, 2005: 207) becomes a task, the aim of which 
is to restore the schematic articulation of the body to basic principles of mean-
ing.  
The connection between body and Weltlichkeit is characterized by a double 
excess insofar as the body’s quality of Leib is concerned. As Mark B. N. Hansen 
claims,  
 
on the one hand, there is an excess of the body’s potential in relation to its actual-
ity (excess of the body over itself) and, on the other, an excess of the body in rela-
tion to being as cosmology (excess of being over the body). [...] the body mani-
fests its potential (phenomenalizes itself) in the very act of preserving it as poten-
tial [...] that is, by moving out from itself toward the world; and correlatively, the 
world manifests itself [...] through actualization in the living body (2005: 254).  
 
In this movement of constant surpassing, we see the belonging of the body 
qua lebendig to the Lebenswelt and the correlation between the body and Um-
welt. At the level of the Lebenswelt, the excessiveness of corporeity manifests 
itself as an excessiveness of life schematism. The life-world is a retranscription 
of life in a symbolic configuration. It represents that milieu in which the logos 
endiathetos encounters the logos prophorikos and in which what is considered 
to be a regularity of life becomes an expression of being. As a world of life 
which transpires in a historical world and thus as a symbolic projection, the life-
world is aesthesiological. This quality of aisthèsis refers also to corporeity. 
The worldly-living regularity of the body, is consequently accompanied by 
an expressiveness that thematizes, an expressiveness grounded in an aesthesi-
ological moment. By means of aisthèsis the body accomplishes its transfer in 
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the body image and projects itself as an imaginary. Thus the Logos of life tran-
spires in this aesthetic transition, being further fulfilled as a constant “com-
merce” and as a reversibility that recalls “those sublimated structures, which 
are laterally designated” (Merleau-Ponty, [1956-1960] 1995: 291). The relation 
between Lebenswelt and Umwelt is defined as an interchange in this “com-
merce”, which is both a commerce of life, and a commerce of the flesh. Accord-
ing to Emmanuel de Saint Aubert, “any commerce is an extension of the ‘com-
merce of the body schemas’, which is rooted in a commerce of the flesh with 
itself [...] as if it were its own ground (comme dans son propre fond)” (2005: 
115)6. The commerce in the body schematism in its relatedness to mundaneity 
marks an Überschuss of being and not only of life. This process is reflected in a 
constant surpassing of the Lebenswelt by the Umwelt, and reciprocally of the 
Umwelt by the Lebenswelt. Their overlapping shows how the regularity of life 
transpires in a mundaneizing movement, in which erasure and actualization are 
phases of the same process.  
The body schematism in its relation to Lebenswelt, surpasses the moment 
of the Umwelt, and becomes a “body-means or an occasion-body for the pro-
jection of a Welt” (Merleau-Ponty, [1959-1960] 1995: 284). The connection to 
Lebenswelt gives thus the possibility to redefine the nature of corporeality both 
in terms of an exchange between body schema(s) and body image(s), and in 
terms of a constant commerce of being. This commerce recalls the intersection 
of existence(s) in corporeal forms - the Ineinander. Being an endless movement 
of life and of modelling in life, “this original commerce is always new and 
though older than anything; it engages a reciprocity of precessions [...]. The 
commerce is therefore more than just a pure Offenheit, because it involves the 
reciprocity of a substantial exchange” (de Saint Aubert 2005: 114)7, which is 
that of life as body schematism.  
The transition between Umwelt and Lebenswelt and that between body 
schema and body image is accomplished as intercorporeal exchange in the 
flesh. The inquiry on a Logos of life, expands in this context to an inquiry on 
flesh and on the world as containing all horizonnal dimensions (Husserl, 1954: 
§37-§40). This Logos reveals itself in a moment of “projection-introjection that 
 
 
6 My transl. 
7 My transl. 
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confirms further the Ineinander” (Merleau-Ponty, [1956-1960] 1995: 281) and 
in the schematism of the body as flesh of the world. 
The point at issue here is that the layers of mundaneity find a correspon-
dence in the layers that define the body schematism and the body imag(ism). 
This is possible in virtue of the interconnection and co-conditioning in layers of 
life. Of import in this context is that a reflection on the realization of life as 
Ineinander leads to an understanding of life as anima-tion8, as expansion in 
which, the living body accomplishes itself as open schematism. The logic of life 
revealed in a display of corporeality in mundaneity, refracts itself in a logic of 
reversibility, affirming a constant doublure in which the existence accomplishes 
and erases itself simultaneously. This correlation, between life and world 
through which the world defines itself as world of life, is equally present in the 
conversion that Merleau-Ponty finds between an intentionality of the conscious-
ness and an operative intentionality (fungierende Intentionalität). I shall point 
out below that such a conversion shines a new light on the correlation between 
body schematism and the logos of life. 
 
 
5. WHAT ROLE FOR INTENTIONALITY IN THE BODY SCHEMATISM? 
 
A discussion of the body schema, which I reframed as a discussion of the 
body schematism, cannot elude the issue of intentionality. As already an-
nounced in his Phénoménologie de la perception, Merleau-Ponty intended to 
bracket consciousness in order to concentrate on corporeity and on the body’s 
capacity to direct (viser) to the world. A first moment of this directedness is 
represented by “motor intentionality” (Merleau-Ponty, 1945: 161). As noted in 
the beginning of this paper, motility is the basic characteristic of the body 
schematism. Yet, motility hides other aspects through which the body opens 
itself to the world and through which the world includes the body. One of these 
aspects is corporeal intentionality, the purpose of which is to guarantee the in-
terconnectedness of the human being’s existence with that of other orders of 
existence9. As Emmanuel de Saint Aubert asserts, “the first virtue of the corpo-
 
 
8 See Emmanuel de Saint Aubert (2005: 109): “Animation is not the assumption of a corporeal envelope 
by a spiritual principle but its internal overflowing (débordement)”.  
9 This idea is already mentioned by Husserl in his chapter on animalia, in the second volume of Ideen.  
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real intentionality is to make things exist, by making us exist and to root thus 
knowledge into a mystery of co-existence” (2005: 137-138)10.  
Such a relation surpasses the regularity that is realized at the level of sub-
jective consciousness, and its intentionality. It refers rather to a structuring 
that is present within corporeal life, defined in terms of nature. As the lectures 
on Nature show, Merleau-Ponty’s project on corporeality developed gradually 
into a project of life. In this context, an obvious consequence is that the inten-
tionality of the body shall not be separated from the intentionality of life. More 
radically, these two types of intentionality should be understood as one. An in-
quiry on the body schematism is meant to stress the combination of these two 
intentional drives and to give an account of their accomplishment through a 
vital movement, “the very essence of our life – our animation” (de Saint Aubert 
2005: 137)11. The question of bodily intentionality and hence of all life, reposi-
tions the inquiry on the constitution of meaning in a new context. The body, by 
its double quality of presence and absence, of affecting and being affected pro-
vides that field which joins opposite tensions and which absorbs any intellectu-
alization. It defines itself as the absolute ground for any subjective manifesta-
tion.  
Being the condition of possibility both for experience and life, the body 
schematism must be described in terms of affection and passivity. Both con-
cepts recall the operative intentionality (fungierende Intentionalität), a concept 
which Merleau-Ponty recovers from Husserl. His conviction that consciousness 
is “in reality an intentionality without acts, fungierende, that the “objects” of 
consciousness themselves are not a positive before us, but [...] specific voids 
(des vides spécifiques)” (Merleau-Ponty, 1964: 292) reorients the analysis to a 
plan of a primary affection where the subject is not separated from the world, 
but where it makes a common ground with it.  
In order to understand the functioning of intentionality in a context where 
the main issue is the body schematism and its legitimacy as a logic of life, we 
need “to turn the tissue of life into operative intentionality” (Merleau-Ponty in 
de Saint Aubert 2005: 147, note 3)12. The correspondence between Logos, life 
and operativeness is therefore necessary if we want to delineate the relation 
 
 
10 My transl. 
11 My transl. 
12 My transl. 
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between intentionality and body schematism. Since the body schematism can 
be understood only as a permanent movement, as pure dynamics (Sheets-
Johnstone 2009b: 273).  
A body intentionality finds a support in the return to an operativeness 
through which life appears as a body interconnectedness and as a body sche-
matic imbrication. This recalls once more the principle of Ineinander which re-
verses the understanding of intentionality. The body schematism impels a con-
sideration of subjectivity as embedded with other corporeal articulations. As a 
result, intentionality and thus the capacity of the subjective sphere of giving 
account of meaning is re-located from a moment of intellectualization to a mo-
ment of living, a moment in which intentionality dissolves into intentional life. 
This idea becomes more obvious if we consider the concept of “flesh” which is 
the summa of all corporeal projects in their quality of life intentions. “Through 
this enlarged notion of intentionality, the phenomenological comprehension dis-
tinguishes itself from the classical ‘intellection’, which is limited to the ‘true and 
immutable nature’, and phenomenology can become a phenomenology of gene-
sis” (Merleau-Ponty, 1945: XIII). An inquiry on the body schematism and on 
the logic of life through which this schematism acquires a grounding validity13, 
the intentional drive is not conceived anymore as something divided between 
an exteriority and an internal sphere. It becomes an introjective movement in 
which the mundane includes the subject. 
The body schematism simulates the oscillation of corporeal intentionality 
and, by its assertion of life, it defines itself through a capacity of affection. As 
beings we are affected by the world in which we live and we affect other beings 
in our turn. Life appears in this perspective as an affective chain. Furthermore, 
insofar as the status of intentional life is concerned,  
 
the me is at the origin of living in as far as it is affected by this living. [...] The ob-
jectifying intentionality is thus to be thought on the background of a latent inten-
tionality, on a life background which requires the consideration of a passive pre-
givenness, which has nothing to do anymore with the passivity given in empiricism 
(Montavont, 1999: 73)14.  
 
 
13 The phenomenological validity in this case does not have a transcendental value, as the Husserlian 
perspective expressed in the first volume of Ideen or the Cartesianische Mediationen, but a life-bound 
value.  
14 My transl. 
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In a phenomenology of life correlated to a phenomenology of affection, 
consciousness in its quality of consciousness-of escapes the schematism of ide-
alities. It becomes instead an affective-receptive milieu (Husserl, 1952: §54, 
213). In such a tension, its capacity to transpire through intentional acts is con-
tained within intentional life (Merleau-Ponty, 1964: 227). An inquiry on the 
body schematism is meant to show that life as nature precedes the intentional 
life of consciousness; it also highlights their intertwining, the return to those 
primary moments in which we emerge as life projects, and consequently as in-
carnated trajectories. A philosophy of the Bewusstsein gives an account of the 
principles which are responsible for the realization of meaning. However, the 
return to corporeity in its form of operative life and affective potential com-
pletes this project. 
The body schematism represents the proper medium to integrate the cor-
poreal subject with a movement of life that precedes it and through which any 
reaction and affection become possible. It is that condition that suffuses inten-
tionality and opens the human being to the ontology of Ineinander. Preceding 
any other actualization, the body schema appears as that very condition of ac-
tuality, which impels the phenomenological perspective to “consider the human 
being first in her being a body, in her way of being a body” (Merleau-Ponty, 
[1956-1960] 1995: 276). 
 
 
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
A phenomenological theory of the body schematism necessarily means in 
the context of a Merleau-Pontyan consideration a theory of mundaneity. The 
body is not a resistance, a refusal that counterpoints the sphere of subjectivity 
or the sphere of “own-ness”. It is on the contrary our possibility to disclose the 
world and at the same time to be disclosed by it. The role of the body schema-
tism is precisely to stress such a process. To theorize the body schematism is 
to overcome “ownness” and to bring in a phenomenology of openness. This is 
one of the meanings expressed in the Merleau-Pontyan concept of Ineinander: 
Offenheit. 
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Further, the body schematism in its understanding as Logos of life shows 
that the body as primary existential project is not a body in itself; it is a body 
which is already intercorporeal, which is inter-schematic since its essence is 
that of going beyond itself in a constant movement toward other living beings. 
An inquiry on the body schematism becomes in this context an inquiry into the 
possibility of living. The living body, being an expression of animation and in-
evitably of motion, becomes a site where other corporeal projects interweave. 
It is in this network created by the living body with other living bodies that the 
Logos of life is delineated in terms of body schematism.  
Thematizing corporeity as schematism, shows that its actualization and dis-
closure transpire as “the life of the bond, as an intercorporeity which makes the 
basso vivo of all our passivities” (de Saint Aubert, 2006: 212)15. In this sense 
the body, in its oscillation between hiding and disclosure enacts altogether with 
a Logic of life, the very essence of being in its being alive.  
The purport of an inquiry on the body schematism in terms of Logic of life is 
an inquiry on meaning in its most active and substantial quality; it is an inquiry 
on “this ‘montage’ of the own body, which allows it to be a body for the world 
(pour le monde)” (Matos Dias, 2001: 74)16 and a body for the living. The body 
schematism is therefore that configuration that “unites us directly to the things 
by its own ontogenesis” (Merleau-Ponty, 1964: 177). Conditioning our move-
ment and being implicitly a principle of animation, the body unfolds us as more 
than moments of living. It unfolds us as moments of being; as projects that 




15 My transl. 
16 My transl. 
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